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SCIRICA, Circuit Judge. 
 
 
 William Harry Brink appeals his conviction for bank 
robbery.  Brink contends the government violated his Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel by placing him in a cell with a known 
informant in a deliberate attempt to elicit self-incriminating 
statements.  He also contends the district court erred by 
allowing him to introduce an eyewitness' prior identification 
only for impeachment purposes, rather than as substantive 
evidence.  Although Brink has made a colorable Sixth Amendment 
claim, the record before us is inadequate to resolve it because 
the district court denied Brink's request for an evidentiary 
hearing.  Therefore, we will vacate the judgment of conviction 
and sentence and remand for an evidentiary hearing to decide that 
issue. 
  I. Facts and Procedure 
 On December 16, 1992, a masked gunman robbed the 
Farmers National Bank in East Brady, Pennsylvania and stole 
$4,434.00 in cash.  Brink was arrested for the crime and charged 
with bank robbery, 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) (1988); armed bank 
robbery, id. § 2113(d); and use of a firearm in a crime of 
violence, id. § 924(c).   
 Before trial, Brink was confined to Clarion County 
prison where he shared a cell with Ronald Scott.  After learning 
  
Scott was scheduled to testify at his trial, Brink discovered 
Scott had been an informant for the Pennsylvania State Police and 
the Federal Bureau of Investigations on five previous occasions.  
Brink requested a pre-trial evidentiary hearing to determine 
Scott's involvement with the State Police and the FBI.  The court 
denied Brink's motion.  At trial, Scott testified that, while in 
Clarion County prison, Brink confessed to committing the bank 
robbery and admitted to manufacturing an alibi.   
 The principal eyewitnesses at trial were Annette Miller 
and Marilyn Ann Simpson, two bank tellers on duty at the time of 
the robbery, who identified Brink as the robber after testifying 
that they knew him both as a customer and from prior 
associations.  They based their identifications on the visible 
parts of his face, his mannerisms and his voice.  Miller stated 
that although she got a good look at his eyes, she could not 
remember what color they were.  An FBI agent, however, testified 
that the day after the robbery, Miller told him the robber had 
dark eyes.1   
 The prosecution also introduced photographs taken by 
bank surveillance cameras,2 testimony that Brink had been seen 
with stacks of money the night after the robbery, and evidence 
                     
1
.  Brink has light hazel eyes. 
2
.  The pictures taken were inconclusive as to the robber's 
identity. 
  
that $220 was found in the sofa of a house where Brink had been 
doing construction work during the week of the robbery.3 
 In defense, Brink offered the testimony of John Olcus, 
his neighbor, and Natalie Reefer, a mail carrier.  Olcus 
testified that he saw Brink at his house at or near the time of 
the robbery.4  Reefer, who did not know Brink but was standing 
with Olcus when a car drove up to Brink's home around the time of 
the robbery, testified that she saw a red Subaru drive up to 
Brink's house and that Olcus told her Brink was the driver.   
 A jury found Brink guilty on all three counts.  Brink 
filed a motion for a new trial, which the court denied.  This 
timely appeal followed.  We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 
1291 (1988).   
 II.  Right to Counsel 
 Over objection, Brink's pre-trial cellmate, Ronald 
Scott, testified that, while in Clarion County prison, Brink told 
him that he robbed the Farmers National Bank and how he devised 
an alibi.  Brink contends the government violated his Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel by placing him in a cell with Scott 
                     
3
.  Two FBI expert witnesses also testified.  A photography 
expert testified to five similar features between the denim 
jacket worn by the robber in the surveillance photographs and a 
jacket obtained from Brink's home.  A firearms expert testified 
that the gun in the photographs was a revolver, as was the gun 
obtained from Brink's home.  Both experts stated they could not 
positively identify the objects in the photographs as the objects 
in evidence. 
 
4
.  Brink's house is approximately 4½ miles from Farmers National 
Bank.  Olcus testified it would take at least 10 minutes to drive 
from the bank to Brink's house. 
  
because, he claims, Scott was a government agent deliberately 
attempting to elicit incriminating evidence outside the presence 
of Brink's counsel.  We apply plenary review to the district 
court's application of legal precepts, see Gregoire v. Centennial 
Sch. Dist., 907 F.2d 1366, 1370 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 
899 (1990), and clearly erroneous review to its factual findings, 
see United States v. Kim, 27 F.3d 947, 958 (3d Cir. 1994); 
Monachelli v. Warden, SCI Graterford, 884 F.2d 749, 750 (3d Cir. 
1989). 
 The deliberate use of jailhouse informants to elicit 
incriminating information may violate a defendant's right to 
counsel. United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 274 (1980); see 
also Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 206 (1964).  In 
Massiah v. United States, the Supreme Court held the government 
violates a prisoner's Sixth Amendment right to counsel when it 
uses, as evidence, statements made by the defendant "which [it] 
had deliberately elicited from him after he had been indicted and 
in the absence of his counsel."  Id. at 206.  Massiah, a merchant 
seamen, had been charged with various narcotics offenses.  Id. at 
202.  After release on bail, Massiah met with Colson, a co-
defendant, in Colson's parked car where, unbeknownst to Massiah, 
Colson had allowed government agents to install a radio 
transmitter under the front seat.  Id. at 202-03.  During the 
course of their meeting, an FBI agent overheard Massiah make 
incriminating statements, which the agent later recounted at 
trial.  On appeal, Massiah maintained that use of the radio 
transmitter was an illegal search under the Fourth Amendment and 
  
that admission of the agent's testimony violated his rights under 
the Fifth and Sixth Amendments by forcing him to incriminate 
himself and by interrogating him outside the presence of his 
attorney.  Id. at 203-04.  Without reaching his other arguments, 
the Court agreed with Massiah on the Sixth Amendment claim.  
Noting that the Constitution guarantees the right to counsel as 
much during the period between arraignment and trial as during 
the trial itself, the Court stated, "`if such a rule is to have 
any efficacy it must apply to indirect and surreptitious 
interrogations as well as those conducted in the jailhouse.  
[M]assiah was more seriously imposed upon . . . because he did 
not even know that he was under interrogation by a government 
agent.'"  Id. at 206 (quoting United States v. Massiah, 307 F.2d 
62, 72-73 (2d Cir. 1962) (Hays, J., dissenting)).  
 In United States v. Henry, the Court reaffirmed the 
principles of Massiah on facts similar to this case.  Like here, 
the defendant in a bank robbery prosecution challenged the 
admission of his pre-trial cellmate's testimony on the grounds 
that the cellmate was a government agent. 447 U.S. at 265.  Even 
though the informant was given specific instructions not to 
question Henry about his case, the Court found the government had 
in fact "deliberately elicited" the information from Henry, 
stating, "[e]ven if the agent's statement that he did not intend 
that [the informant] would take affirmative steps to secure 
incriminating information is accepted, he must have known that 
such propinquity likely would lead to that result."  Id. at 271.  
Consequently, the Court found that the government violated 
  
Henry's right to counsel by "intentionally creating a situation 
likely to induce Henry to make incriminating statements without 
the assistance of counsel."  Id. at 274; see also Maine v. 
Moulton, 474 U.S. 159 (1985) (right to counsel violated where 
codefendant, as government agent, meets with defendant and 
discusses crime, even though defendant, not government, requested 
meeting). 
 Massiah and Henry establish that the government 
violates a pre-trial detainee's right to counsel when it 
deliberately creates a situation in which a prisoner is likely to 
make incriminating statements, Henry, 447 U.S. at 274, and 
deliberately uses an informant to elicit information from the 
prisoner, Massiah, 447 U.S. at 269.  But the Court stopped short 
of excluding all incriminating statements reported by jailhouse 
informants, and "left open the question whether the Sixth 
Amendment forbids admission in evidence of an accused's 
statements to a jailhouse informant who was `placed in close 
proximity but [made] no effort to stimulate conversations about 
the crime charged.'" Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 456 (1986) 
(quoting Henry, 447 U.S. at 271 n.9)(alteration in Kuhlmann).   
 In Kuhlmann v. Wilson, the Court held that where a 
prisoner makes incriminating statements to a passive listener -- 
a "listening post" -- the introduction of the prisoner's 
statements does not violate his right to counsel because the 
informant's presence does not constitute an interrogation. 477 
U.S. at 459 (primary concern of Massiah line of decisions is 
secret interrogation with techniques equivalent to direct police 
  
interrogation).  In that case, the defendant and two accomplices 
robbed a taxicab garage and murdered the night dispatcher.  Id. 
at 438-39.  After arraignment, Kuhlmann was held in detention and 
placed in a cell with Lee, a police informant, who had agreed to 
aid the police in getting information about Kuhlmann's 
accomplices.  Id. at 439.  Lee had been expressly instructed not 
to ask Kuhlmann any questions about his case, but instead to 
"keep his ears open."  Id.  Although Kuhlmann never divulged the 
names of his accomplices, he admitted to committing the crime to 
Lee who reported it to the police.  The state trial court 
expressly found that Lee did not elicit statements from Kuhlmann 
and that Kuhlmann's statements were "spontaneous" and 
"unsolicited."  Id. at 440.  Kuhlmann was then convicted by a 
jury.  After unsuccessful appeals in the state court system and 
unsuccessful petitions for federal habeas corpus, the Supreme 
Court handed down its opinion in Henry whereupon Kuhlmann renewed 
his petition for federal habeas corpus.  After a divided panel of 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit granted 
Kuhlmann's petition, id. at 441-43, the Supreme Court reversed.  
Noting the presumption of correctness that must be afforded the 
trial court's factual finding, id. at 460, the Court held that 
introduction of Kuhlmann's self-incriminating statements did not 
violate his right to counsel because his spontaneous statements 
were not the result of an interrogation, id. at 459. 
 Henry and Kuhlmann set the bounds for using a 
prisoner's self-incriminating statements made to jailhouse 
informants.  The government violates a prisoner's right to 
  
counsel when it places that prisoner in a cell with a jailhouse 
informant who "deliberately use[s] his position to secure 
incriminating information from [the defendant] when counsel was 
not present." Henry, 447 U.S. at 270.  But it does not violate a 
prisoner's rights where "by luck or happenstance -- the State 
obtains incriminating statements from the accused after the right 
to counsel has attached." Kuhlmann, 477 U.S. at 459.   
 In finding the government deliberately elicited 
statements from the defendant in Henry, the Court found three 
factors to be significant: (1) the informant acted under 
instructions as a paid informant for the government;5 (2) the 
informant appeared to be just another inmate; and (3) the 
defendant was in custody at the time the informant engaged him in 
conversations. 447 U.S. at 270.  Because Scott presented himself 
as just another inmate and Brink was in custody the second and 
third factors are evident here.  The only questions are whether 
Scott was acting as a government agent when he got Brink to tell 
him about the crime and whether that information was elicited 
deliberately.   
 In this case, even though Scott maintains he was not 
instructed to question Brink about the robbery, there is some 
                     
5
.  Although the Supreme Court emphasized the fact that the 
informant was "paid", 447 U.S. at 270 & n.7, we do not understand 
the Court to imply that only informants who receive cash are 
"paid informants."  Instead, we believe the Court meant that any 
informant who is offered money, benefits, preferential treatment, 
or some future consideration, including, but not limited to, a 
reduction in sentence, in exchange for eliciting information is a 
paid informant. 
  
evidence that Scott deliberately elicited information from 
Brink.6  On this record, however, it is unclear whether Scott was 
acting as a government agent while sharing Brink's cell.  An 
inmate who voluntarily furnishes information without instruction 
from the government is not a government agent, even if the 
informant had been an agent in the past. See United States v. Van 
Scoy, 654 F.2d 257, 260 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1126 
(1981).  Because Scott admitted acting as a government agent in 
other cases,7 but denied receiving any promises or rewards for 
informing on Brink, he may fall within this category. 
 But the record also contains evidence suggesting that 
Scott may have had a tacit agreement with the government.  Scott 
testified that he began informing in the hopes of having his 
sentence reduced.  The government trained him as an informant and 
at one point a government agent told Scott that his cooperation 
would be reported to the United States Attorney and the Attorney 
General.8  Therefore, Scott may have informed on Brink on the 
                     
6
.  The district court did not make a finding on whether Scott 
elicited information from Brink, but there is a colorable claim 
that Scott may have been more than just a listening post.  On 
cross-examination, at trial, Scott admitted that when acting as a 
government agent his method of obtaining information was to lie 
to his cellmates to gain their trust.  Scott admitted lying to 
Brink, and acknowledged he had gained Brink's trust.  Scott also 
discussed Brink's case with him, telling Brink he thought Brink 
was guilty, and even discussed the possibility of Brink escaping 
during a break in the trial. 
7
.  Scott admitted to volunteering to be a government informant 
in 1990 or 1991.  Since then he has informed on at least six 
inmates in three jails or prisons. 
8
.  This case is unlike Van Scoy, where the informant did not 
receive any favorable treatment from the FBI, 654 F.2d at 260, 
  
reasonable assumption that government officials were aware of his 
actions and would reward him in the future, if not presently, 
with a recommendation for a reduction in his sentence.   
 It is also significant that after Scott began 
informing, the government placed him in a cell with a pretrial 
detainee.  Scott testified that a state trooper approached him 
while he was sharing a cell with Brink to ask if Brink had given 
Scott any information about the crime.  Since the government was 
aware of Scott's propensity to inform on his cellmates, we 
believe that placing him in a cell with a pretrial detainee could 
represent a deliberate effort to obtain incriminating information 
from a prisoner in violation of his Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel.  Cf. Henry, 447 U.S. at 271 (government presumed to have 
known that placing informant in a cell with pretrial detainee 
would lead to informant taking affirmative steps to get 
incriminating statements). 
 We believe Brink has raised a colorable claim that the 
government violated his constitutional right to counsel by 
placing him in a cell with a known informant who may have been 
acting as a government agent.  In these instances, the trial 
court should conduct an evidentiary hearing and make the 
necessary findings since such conduct, if proven, could violate a 
defendant's rights under the Sixth Amendment.9  Because the 
(..continued) 
since the government honored Scott's request to be placed in the 
witness protection program after he testified against a cellmate 
in an earlier trial. 
9
.  "Most constitutional errors have been held amenable to 
harmless-error analysis." Sullivan v. Louisiana, 113 S. Ct. 2078, 
  
district court declined to hold an evidentiary hearing, we will 
vacate the judgment of conviction and sentence and remand for a 
hearing to determine whether Brink's rights under the Sixth 
Amendment were violated.  Should the district court make this 
determination, Brink will be entitled to a new trial. 
 III.  Prior Identification 
 At trial, bank teller Annette Miller testified she was 
unable to recall the bank robber's eye color.  FBI Agent 
McEachern testified that the day after the robbery, Miller told 
him the bank robber had dark colored eyes.  Brink, whose eyes are 
light hazel, sought to use Miller's prior statement as 
substantive evidence of his innocence, but the court refused and 
instead gave the following instruction: 
 You will recall that certain witnesses who 
testified during the trial had made 
statements before this trial about matters at 
issue in this case.  These earlier statements 
(..continued) 
2081 (1993).  Because the erroneous admission of a coerced 
confession does not automatically warrant a new trial, see Milton 
v. Wainwright, 407 U.S. 371, 377-78 (1972); see also Arizona v. 
Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 311 (1991) (Opinion of Rehnquist, C.J., 
for the Court), the district court judgment would stand if 
admitting Brink's confession was harmless beyond a reasonable 
doubt, Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967); see also 
Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 295-96.  We find, however, that the 
admission of Brink's confession, if error, was not harmless.  
When reviewing constitutional violations for harmless error our 
inquiry "is not whether, in a trial that occurred without the 
error, a guilty verdict would surely have been rendered, but 
whether the guilty verdict actually rendered in this trial was 
surely unattributable to the error." Sullivan, 113 S. Ct. at 
2081.  On this record we hold the guilty verdict was not surely 
unattributable to the introduction of Brink's confession, and 
therefore was not harmless. Cf. Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 296-302 
(admission of coerced confession was not harmless despite 
admission of a second, lawfully-obtained confession and other 
circumstantial evidence). 
  
were brought to your attention to help you 
decide if you believe that witness' 
testimony.  You cannot use these earlier 
statements as evidence in this case. 
 Brink contends the district court erred because Federal 
Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(C) allows statements of prior 
identification to be admitted as substantive evidence.   
 a. 
 At the outset we must determine the proper scope of 
review.  The government contends our review should be for plain 
error.  Generally, we review evidentiary rulings for abuse of 
discretion, see, e.g., In re Merritt Logan, Inc., 901 F.2d 349, 
359 (3d Cir. 1990), but when no objection is made at trial we 
review for plain error only. See Government of Virgin Islands v. 
Smith, 949 F.2d 677, 681 (3d Cir. 1991); United States v. Castro, 
776 F.2d 1118, 1128 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1029 
(1986).10  This rule gives the court an opportunity to correct 
any mistakes before charging the jury, Santos, 932 F.2d at 251; 
United States v. Chicarelli, 445 F.2d 1111, 1115 (3d Cir. 
1971)(quoting United States v. Provenzano, 334 F.2d 678, 690 (3d 
                     
10
.  The plain error doctrine "is intended to correct errors that 
are `obvious' or that otherwise seriously affect the fairness, 
integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.'"  
Government of Virgin Islands v. Charleswell, 24 F.3d 571, 576 (3d 
Cir. 1994) (quoting United States v. Atkinson, 297 U.S. 157, 160 
(1936)).  The doctrine provides for correction of a mistake "so 
`plain' the trial judge [was] derelict in countenancing it, even 
absent the defendant's timely" objection. United States v. Frady, 
456 U.S. 152, 163 (1982); see also Government of Virgin Islands 
v. Knight, 989 F.2d 619, 631-32 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. 
Ct. 556 (1993); United States v. Santos, 932 F.2d 244, 251 (3d 
Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 592 (1991). 
  
Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 947 (1964)), and prevents the 
appellant from purposely failing to object in the hopes of later 
asserting the court's error as the basis for a new trial, 
Chicarelli, 445 F.2d at 1116 (quoting United States v. Grosso, 
358 F.2d 154, 158 (3d Cir. 1966), rev'd on other grounds, 390 
U.S. 62 (1968)).  
 Brink challenged the instruction, stating, "With regard 
to identification, we believe that under the federal rules it is 
not hearsay."  The government maintains Brink's statement was not 
specific enough to constitute an objection.  We disagree.  
Although Brink did not mention Rule 801(d)(1)(C) expressly, his 
objection was sufficiently specific to inform the district court. 
Cf. Santos, 932 F.2d at 250-51 (finding appellant's statement "I 
object to the refusal to charge points 1 through 6 of defendant's 
proposed points of charge" too general to alert district court to 
the specific objection raised on appeal); see also United States 
v. Castro, 776 F.2d 1118, 1129 (3d Cir. 1985).  Because Brink's 
challenge put the district court on notice of the issue now 
raised on appeal, we review the district court ruling for abuse 
of discretion. 
 b. 
 The Federal Rules of Evidence provide "A statement is 
not hearsay if . . . one of identification of a person made after 
perceiving the person." Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(1)(C) (West 1994).  
Statements of prior identification are admitted as substantive 
evidence because of "the generally unsatisfactory and 
inconclusive nature of courtroom identifications as compared with 
  
those made at an earlier time under less suggestive conditions." 
Fed. R. Evid. 801, Notes of Advisory Committee on 1972 Proposed 
Rules; see S. Rep. No. 199, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1975) ("Both 
experience and psychological studies suggest that identifications 
consisting of nonsuggestive lineups, photographic spreads, or 
similar identifications, made reasonably soon after the offense, 
are [more] reliable than in-court identifications.").  "Admitting 
these prior identifications therefore provides greater fairness 
to both the prosecution and the defense in a criminal trial."  
Id. 
  Generally, evidence is admitted under Rule 801(d)(1)(C) 
when a witness has identified the defendant in a lineup or 
photospread, but forgets, or changes, his testimony at trial.  
See, e.g., United States v. O'Malley, 796 F.2d 891, 898-99 (7th 
Cir. 1986); United States v. Jarrad, 754 F.2d 1451, 1456 (9th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 830 (1985).  Although less common, 
Miller's "exculpatory" prior identification falls within the 
rule.  The rule's plain language does not exclude exculpatory 
statements, nor can we find any reason to distrust the 
reliability of this kind of identification. 
 Moreover, the fact that FBI agent McEachern, rather 
than Miller, recited Miller's statement at trial does not 
preclude introducing her statement as substantive evidence.  
Debate on the 1975 amendment to the Rule demonstrates Congress 
was aware that third parties would testify to the witness's prior 
statements. See 121 Cong. Rec. 31,867 (1975) (statement of Rep. 
Hungate) ("The bill . . . applies to situations where an 
  
eyewitness has previously identified a person out of court.  It 
would admit into evidence testimony of that identification.  For 
example, testimony by a police officer that at a lineup John Doe 
identified the defendant as the man who robbed his store."). See 
generally, Jack B. Weinstein and Margaret A. Berger, Weinstein's 
Evidence, ¶ 801(d)(1)(C)[01], at 801-222 (1993) ("If at trial the 
eyewitness fails to remember or denies that he made the 
identification, the previous statements of the eyewitness can be 
proved by the testimony of a person to whom the statement was 
made, and the statement can be given substantive effect.").  
Thus, Miller's statement should have been admitted as substantive 
evidence. 
 c. 
 The government maintains that Brink is not entitled to 
a new trial because the district court's error, if any, was 
harmless.  Like resolution of Brink's Sixth Amendment claim, 
resolving this issue depends on whether Scott was acting as a 
government agent while collecting information on Brink. 
 Under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(a) "any 
error, defect or variance which does not affect substantial 
rights shall be disregarded." Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(a)(West 1994).  
An error that does not implicate a constitutional right is 
harmless where it is "`unimportant in relation to everything else 
the jury considered on the issue in question as revealed in the 
record.'" United States v. Palmieri, 21 F.3d 1265, 1273 (3d Cir. 
1994), petition for cert. filed Aug. 1, 1994 (No. 94-5463) 
(quoting Yates v. Evatt, 500 U.S. 391, 403 (1991)).  Upon 
  
reviewing the entire record, we believe that, provided Scott's 
testimony was properly admitted at trial, the district court's 
error was harmless. 
 Scott testified that, when they were cellmates, Brink 
confessed to the robbery.  The bank tellers, Miller and Simpson, 
made positive in-court identifications11 and Brink's friend, 
                     
11
.  Simpson testified: 
 
 Q: How do you know that Billy Brink robbed you on 
December 16, 1992? 
 
 A: I could tell who he was.  I could see through the 
ski mask.  The holes around the eyes and the mouth 
were big enough to see.  I could recognize his 
features, his voice, the way he walked, his 
mannerisms. 
 
 Q: Now you have identified several characteristics.  
Did you know Billy Brink prior to December 16, 
1992. 
 
 A: Yes, I did. 
 
 Q: And how was it that you knew him or knew of him? 
 
 A: I knew of him all his life.  My son coached him in 
midget football, I think junior high, and probably 
varsity football also.  But, I just know that he -
- you know, I have known of him. 
 
 Q: Now, was he a customer of the Farmers National 
Bank? 
 
 A: Yes, he was. 
 
 Q: When was the last time you had seen him in the 
bank prior to December 16th. 
 
 A: Probably around the first week in December he was 
in the bank. 
 
Appendix at 94. 
 
Miller testified: 
  
William Rumbarger, testified that on the evening after the 
robbery, he saw Brink carrying two, three-quarter inch stacks of 
cash in large denominations.  These, together with other 
circumstantial evidence, provide sufficient evidence of Brink's 
guilt.12  
(..continued) 
 
 Q: And how is it that you were able to identify 
[Brink]? 
 
 A: Just -- when he came to the window, it was him.  I 
mean, from what I know of him and seen of him, it 
was Bill Brink. 
 
Appendix at 110. 
 
 
 Q: [Y]ou knew him because one of his friends was 
dating your best friend.  Is that how you knew 
him? 
 
 A: That's how I knew who he was at first, yes. 
 
 Q: And then you also saw him play football.  Is that 
what your testimony is? 
 
 A: Yeah.  I saw him play football and, I mean, we 
went to two small high schools.  I mean, everybody 
knew who everybody was in the two schools. 
 
Appendix at 114. 
12
.  Claiming the pre-trial identifications of Miller and Simpson 
were subject to the same limiting instruction as Miller's 
statement regarding the robber's eye color, the government 
contends the jury was instructed not to view their testimony as 
substantive evidence, but instead to use it to judge their 
credibility.  Consequently, the government maintains that 
limiting the use of Miller's statement about the robber's eye 
color, if error, was harmless because the court's instruction 
hurt the government's case more than the defendant's.  Although 
we find the government's argument unconvincing, we agree the 
error was harmless. 
  
 If Scott did not violate Brink's Sixth Amendment rights 
his testimony was properly allowed into evidence. See Kuhlmann, 
477 U.S. at 459 (evidence gained by luck or happenstance does not 
violate defendant's right to counsel).  In that case, any error 
regarding the identification was harmless because Brink's 
confession coupled with the in-court identification and the 
circumstantial evidence provides sufficient evidence of his 
guilt.  On the other hand, if Brink's rights were violated he is 
entitled to a new trial on that basis alone, see supra note 9, 
and we would not need to reach the evidentiary issue.  
Consequently, we hold that if, after an evidentiary hearing, the 
district court determines Scott did not violate Brink's Sixth 
Amendment rights, the district court's failure to admit Miller's 
statement of prior identification was harmless error.13 
                     
13
.  Brink raises two other issues on appeal.  He claims the 
district court erred by not interrupting jury deliberations to 
allow him to demonstrate that the denim jacket, taken from his 
home and entered into evidence on the theory that it was worn 
during the robbery, did not fit him.  After jury deliberations 
begin, a district judge has wide discretion in deciding whether 
to reopen a case. United States v. Golomb, 754 F.2d 86, 89 (2d 
Cir. 1985); see Drummond v. United States, 350 F.2d 983, 991 (8th 
Cir. 1965) (Blackmun, J.), cert. denied sub nom. Castaldi v. 
United States, 384 U.S. 944 (1966).  The court denied Brink's 
request because he offered no excuse for failing to raise the 
issue earlier, and because it believed interrupting deliberations 
might suggest to the jurors that the jacket was more important 
than other pieces of evidence.  We find no abuse of discretion 
here. See Fernandez v. United States, 329 F.2d 899, 903 (9th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 832 (1964); cf. United States v. 
Burger, 419 F.2d 1293, 1295 (5th Cir. 1969) (trial court should 
exercise its discretion with caution).  
     Brink also contests the district court's ruling that allowed 
two experts to testify about similarities between items seized 
from Brink's home and those identified on the bank's surveillance 
photographs.  Brink argues that because these experts were unable 
to testify to a reasonable degree of scientific certainty, their 
  
 IV. Conclusion 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate the judgment 
of the district court and remand this case for further 
proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. 
(..continued) 
testimony should have been stricken as conjecture.  We find no 
merit in this argument.  The decision whether to admit expert 
testimony is within the broad discretion of the trial court, 
United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1229 (3d Cir. 1985); 
United States v. Cyphers, 553 F.2d 1064, 1072 (7th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 434 U.S. 843 (1977), and a court generally does not abuse 
its discretion where the expert bases its opinion on the type of 
data a reasonable expert in the field would use in rendering an 
opinion on the subject at issue, see Deluca v. Merrell Dow 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 911 F.2d 941, 955 (3d Cir. 1990); see also 
Michael H. Graham, Expert Witness Testimony and the Federal Rules 
of Evidence: Insuring Adequate Assurance of Trustworthiness, 1986 
U. Ill. L. Rev. 43 (reasonable degree of scientific certainty 
refers to whether the expert relied on a theory accepted by a 
recognized segment of the particular field to which the expert 
belongs); cf. Cyphers, 553 F.2d at 1072-73 ("[A]n expert's lack 
of absolute certainty goes to weight of testimony, not its 
admissibility."); Stutzman v. CRST, Inc., 997 F.2d 291, 296 (7th 
Cir. 1993). 
